De potestate et voluntate Dei
839AQuaeritur de potestate Dei, an major sit voluntate ejus. Si enim plus potest Deus quam vult, videretur potestas ejus major quam voluntas. Si autem potestas ejus major est quam voluntas ejus, videretur in eo esse inaequale aliquid, et non totus sibi convenire Deus. Quomodo ergo unum est totum quod est, si majus et minus ibi est? Si vero idem illi est et posse et velle, eadem est potestas ejus et voluntas ejus. Si autem idem illi est et posse et velle, quidquid vult potest, et quidquid potest vult. Vult autem omne quod facit, quia contra voluntatem nihil facit, qui voluntarie facit quidquid facit. Rursum omne quod vult facit, quia ad omnia posse adest, cum velle non deest. Si ergo amplius non potest Deus facere quam vult, neque amplius facere vult quam 839Bfacit, constat procul dubio quod amplius facere non potest quam facit. Amplius: Si potest Deus plus facere quam vult, potest contra voluntatem suam facere, et facere quod in voluntate non habet, et est potestas ejus contraria voluntati ejus. Unde consequens esse videtur, quod omne quod potest et vult, facit; sicut omne quod facit, potest et vult. Sic omne quod potest vult, sicut omne quod vult potest. Sed si hoc recepitur quod Deus aliud vel aliter nihil facere possit quam facit, necessitate operatur omnia, et alligatur atque constringitur lege operum suorum ut dominetur ei conditio operis sui; sed hoc nefas est confiteri. Quomodo ergo, inquiunt, idem est Deo velle et posse, si major est potestas ejus 839Cquam voluntas? Videte quid dicunt. Major, inquiunt, secundum vos, potestas Dei est quam voluntas ejus. Quare? Quia dicitis Deum plus quam velle. Intendite. Si idcirco major dici debet potestas Dei quam voluntas ejus, quia multa facere potest quae facere non vult; ergo et voluntas major esse dicatur quam potestas, quia multa quae facere potest non facit, quia facere non vult. Si enim potestas major dicitur, quia voluntatem transcendit; et voluntas major dicatur, quia potestatem constringit. Sed, sicut potestas non coarctatur in eo quod sine voluntate nihil operatur; ita et voluntas non superatur in eo quod non ad omnia quae in potestate sunt dilatatur. Tria sunt, affectus, effectus et respectus. Voluntas ergo et potestas in Deo et affectu et effectu 839Dunum sunt, sed respectu ad unum non sunt. Quomodo haec duo in Deo affectu unum sunt? Quia in ipso nec voluntas sine potestate est, nec potestas 840Asine voluntate. Potestas sine voluntate esset, si aliquando haberet potentiam, quam habere nollet. Rursus voluntas sine potestate esset, si aliquando non ex virtute, sed ex infirmitate aliquid vellet. Quia ergo et potestas in ipso semper voluntaria est, et voluntas potestativa (quoniam quod potest, omne posse vult; et quod vult, omne ex potestate vult); idcirco in ipso nec potestas sine voluntate est, nec voluntas sine potestate est. Similiter in effectu nec voluntas a potestate, nec potestas a voluntate ullatenus separari potest. Quidquid enim Deus voluntate facit, facit et potestate; et rursum quidquid facit potestate, facit et voluntate. Quia omnia quae facit et voluntate et potestate facit. Ergo in omni opere suo Deus et voluntatem et potestatem exercet; nec 840Bse dividunt in opere, quae dividi non possunt in operante. Sic igitur potestas Dei et voluntas et affectu in ipso et effectu per ipsum indivisa perseverant, respectu extra ipsum dissimiliter se demonstrant. Quia enim Deus veraciter non omne quod potest velle dicitur, quia multa facere potest quae facere non vult, nihil autem facere vult quod facere non potest; ideo ad quaedam respicit potestas ejus ad quae non respicit voluntas ejus. Ad omnia autem ad quae respicit voluntas ejus, respicit potestas ejus. Sic igitur potestas divina respectu aliquando ad alia se habet quam voluntas, sed in se aliud non habet quam voluntas, quia contra voluntatem nihil habet.
840CSed dicunt: Si Deus aliquid facere potest quod non vult, aliquid facere potest contra voluntatem suam. Si autem contra voluntatem suam aliquid facere potest, non est omnipotens qui cogi potest et duci ad id quod non vult. Sed videte quomodo cohaereat, quod dicunt, quod si Deus aliquid facere potest quod facere non vult, ergo contra voluntatem suam aliquid facere potest. Contra voluntatem suam quippe faceret si faceret quod facere nollet. Non autem idcirco quia aliquid facere potest quod facere non vult, contra voluntatem suam facere potest, quia si id faceret quod facere potest, et non vult, jam illud facere vellet quod faceret; sicut modo, quia facere non vult non facit quod tamen facere posset, si vellet. Sic praescientia et praedestinatio in 840DDeo, si secundum respectum considerantur, dissimiliter se habent, cum tamen in Deo unum sint. Praescientia enim et ad mala et ad bona se habet. Praedestinatio 841Aad bona tantum. Omnia quippe futura praescivit, electos autem tantum praedestinavit. Similiter et praedestinatio, quando pro dispositione accipitur, in respectu tamen praescientiae parificari non potest, quia praescientia Dei et ad ea quae facturus est pertinet, et ad ea quae permissurus. Praedestinatio 842Aautem ad ea quae facturus est tantum. Ambrosius enim dicit: « Praedestinavit Deus impiorum gehennam, sed non praedestinavit impiorum culpam. » Quod enim facturus fuit praedestinavit, quod autem facturus non fuit, sed permissurus, non praedestinavit, sed praescivit.
On the Power and the Will of God
839AIt is asked concerning the power of God, whether it be greater than his will. For if God can do more than he wills, his power would seem greater than his will. But if his power is greater than his will, there would seem to be something unequal in him, and God would not wholly agree with himself. How then is the whole that he is one, if greater and lesser are there? But if to be able and to will are the same for him, then his power and his will are the same. And if to be able and to will are the same for him, then whatever he wills he can do, and whatever he can do he wills. Now he wills everything that he does, because he does nothing against his will — he who does voluntarily whatever he does. Again, everything that he wills he does, because the power for all things is present, since the will is not lacking. If therefore God cannot do more than he wills, nor wills to do more than 839Bhe does, it stands beyond doubt that he cannot do more than he does. Furthermore: if God can do more than he wills, he can act against his own will, and do what he does not have in his will, and his power is contrary to his will. Whence it seems to follow that everything which he can do and wills, he does; just as everything which he does, he can do and wills. Thus everything that he can do he wills, just as everything that he wills he can do. But if this is accepted, that God can do nothing other or otherwise than he does, then he works all things by necessity, and is bound and constrained by the law of his own works, so that the condition of his work rules over him; but this it is impious to confess. How then, they say, are willing and being able the same for God, if his power is greater 839Cthan his will? See what they say. Greater, they say, according to you, is God's power than his will. Why? Because you say that God can do more than he wills. Attend. If God's power ought to be called greater than his will on this ground, that he can do many things which he does not will to do, then let his will also be called greater than his power, because there are many things which he can do but does not do, since he does not will to do them. For if power is called greater because it transcends the will, let the will also be called greater because it constrains the power. But just as power is not narrowed by the fact that it works nothing without the will, so too the will is not surpassed by the fact that it does not extend itself to all things that are within its power. There are three things: affect, effect, and respect. Will and power in God, then, are one both in affect and in effect, 839Dbut in respect they are not directed to one. How are these two one in God in affect? Because in him neither is the will without power, nor is power 840Awithout will. Power would be without will if it ever had a power which it would not will to have. Again, will would be without power if it ever willed something not from strength but from weakness. Since therefore in him power is always voluntary, and the will is powerful (because whatever he can do, all his ability he wills; and whatever he wills, he wills entirely from power), therefore in him neither is power without will, nor is will without power. Likewise, in effect, neither can the will be separated in any way from power, nor power from will. For whatever God does by will, he does also by power; and again, whatever he does by power, he does also by will. Because all things that he does, he does both by will and by power. Therefore in every work of his God exercises both will and power; nor do 840Bthey divide themselves in the work, which cannot be divided in the worker. Thus therefore the power and will of God remain undivided both in affect within him and in effect through him, but in respect outside him they show themselves differently. For because God is truly said not to will everything that he can do — since he can do many things which he does not will to do, but wills to do nothing which he cannot do — therefore his power has regard to certain things to which his will does not have regard. But to all things to which his will has regard, his power has regard. Thus therefore the divine power, in respect, is sometimes disposed toward other things than the will is, but in itself it has nothing other than the will, because it has nothing against the will.
840CBut they say: If God can do something that he does not will, he can do something against his own will. But if he can do something against his own will, he is not omnipotent — he who can be compelled and led to that which he does not will. But see how what they say holds together: that if God can do something which he does not will to do, then he can do something against his own will. For he would act against his own will if he did what he would not will to do. But it is not the case that, because he can do something which he does not will to do, he can therefore act against his own will; for if he did that which he can do but does not will, he would then already will to do that which he did — just as now, because he does not will to do it, he does not do what nevertheless he could do, if he willed. So foreknowledge and predestination in 840DGod, if they are considered according to respect, are disposed differently, although in God they are one. For foreknowledge is disposed toward both evils and goods. Predestination 841Atoward goods only. For he foreknew all future things, but predestined only the elect. Likewise predestination too, when it is taken for disposition, yet cannot be made equal in respect to foreknowledge, because God's foreknowledge pertains both to those things which he is going to do and to those which he is going to permit. But predestination 842Aonly to those things which he is going to do. For Ambrose says: « God predestined the hell of the impious, but did not predestine the guilt of the impious. » For what he was going to do, he predestined; but what he was not going to do, but to permit, he did not predestine, but foreknew.