De tribus appropriatis personis in Trinitate
991BQuaeris a me, mi Bernarde, quid mihi videatur de illa Augustini sententia, in qua attribuitur Patri unitas, Filio aequalitas, Spiritui sancto utriusque concordia. Libenter aperio mihi alteri quod sentio, communicare volens si quid recte, vel ex quantulacunque parte sapio, simul et corrigi ambiens, si quid aliter sentio: propria, si placet, singulorum consideremus, et forte illucescet quod quaerimus. 991CSubsistentia ingeniti, quae ab alia aliqua non est, in eo quod substantialiter vel personaliter est, nullam pluralitatem ingerit, nullam pluralitatem concludit: nam in eo quod gignit, nihil sibi, sed soli Filio confert, ut sit geniti autem subsistentia, quae ab alia accepit quod habet, sicut nec esse per seipsam, sic nec per seipsam intelligi valet. Si igitur pluralitatem ingerit subsistentia Filii, quanto magis quae a duobus est subsistentia Spiritus sancti? Recte igitur unitas Patri attribuitur, in cujus subsistentiae consideratione nulla pluralitas concurrere videtur. Addamus et illud, quia, quidquid substantialiter dici potest, veraciter unum est. Sed dicis, quia et hoc ei cum 991Dcaeteris commune est, sed procul dubio solus Pater habet hoc secundum, ut sic dicam, principalitatem: nam caeteri secundum acceptionem, et juxta alterius similitudinem. Hinc ergo colligitur cur ei unitas juxta hanc considerationem quasi specialiter attribuitur. Ecce quomodo in Patre unitas, quaeramus quomodo in Filio aequalitas. Certe ubi nulla pluralitas est, nec aequalitas recte vel dici, vel intelligi potest. Sicut enim nihil recte dicitur sibi simile, sic nec aequale. Itaque ubi primo pluralitas occurrit, ibi et aequalitatem primum quaerere oportebit. Constat autem quia Filius imago est Patris sui, non autem Pater imago Filii. Hinc illud Augustini. Non autem Pater et Filius simul ambo imago, sed Filius solus imago Patris. Audi et illud ejusdem. Imago 992Bsi perfecte implet illud cujus imago est, ipsa coaequatur ei, non illud imagini suae. Certum est autem quod Filius plenitudinem ejus capit et exprimit, cujus imago existit. Itaque secundum sententiam Augustini, Filius coaequatur Patri, non Pater suae imagini. Recte igitur aequalitas attribuitur non Patri, sed Filio. Sed cur, inquis, non etiam Spiritui sancto? Sed si des cur solus in Trinitate Filius 992Cdicitur imago alterius, consequenter accipies cur aequalitas attribuatur soli Filio, non autem simul et Spiritui sancto. In his vero quae secundum substantiam dicuntur, non solum Filio, sed et Spiritui sancto aequalitas attribuitur, sed secundum principalitatem habet hoc solus Filius, non autem Spiritus sanctus. Verumtamen si in hujusmodi loquendi proprietas servaretur, magis identitas quam aequalitas diceretur. Ecce jam habes cur unitas Patri, cur aequalitas attribuatur Filio; restat quaerendum cur utriusque concordia attribuatur Spiritui sancto. Sicut qualitas nulla est sine consistentium pluralitate, sic nec quid tertium ponitur concordia duorum, sine consistentium Trinitate. In Patre origo unitatis, in Filio inchoatio pluralitatis, in Spiritu sancto completio Trinitatis. 992DHinc tibi elucescere debet, quam merito dicatur caeterorum concordia, ille qui est tertia in Trinitate persona. Consideremus nunc propria singulorum, et videbimus quia alia est habitudo Patris ad Filium, alia ad Spiritum sanctum. Nihilominus aliter se habet Filius ad eumdem Spiritum, et aliter ad Patrem suum. Uniformiter autem habent tam Pater quam Filius ad Spiritum amborum, et e converso uniformiter se habet idem Spiritus tam ad Patrem quam Filium. Recte ergo caeterorum concordia dicitur, in quo habitudinis uniformitas omniformiter invenitur. Addamus et illud, quia plenitudinem concordiae facit idem velle, et idem nolle, recte itaque duorum concordia dicitur, qui est 993Aamor utriusque. Cur autem amor potius quam amborum sapientia dicitur, alia quaestio videtur. Nunc vero videamus quomodo intelligendum sit, quod Augustinus ad illa superius posita, et exposita adjungit, cum dicit: Et tria haec unum omnia propter Patrem, aequalia omnia propter Filium, connexa omnia propter Spiritum sanctum. Si sola ingeniti persona fuisset nihilominus in divinitate unitas esset. Primordialiter itaque est, ut sic dicam, unitas in solo ingenito, sed juxta ejus similitudinem, vel emanationem tam in unigenito, quam in Spiritu sancto. Item, si sola ingeniti persona esset, nulla in divinitate aequalitas fuisset; et si sola Spiritus sancti persona deesset, nihilominus in divinitate aequalitas fuisset. Hinc est perpendere 993Bquae aequalitas primordialiter est in solo unigenito, juxta tamen ejus similitudinem est etiam in Spiritu sancto. Tolle Spiritum sanctum, non erit in divinitate qui sit connexio plurium. Sed forte adhuc exigis cur, existente Trinitate, omnium connexio attribuatur soli Spiritui sancto. Sed scimus quoniam reliqui duo differenter se habent ad unigenitum, solus autem Spiritus sanctus indifferenter se habet tam ad ingenitum quam ad genitum, et ambo illorum uniformiter se habent ad Spiritum sanctum. Singulariter itaque omnium connexio attribuitur Spiritui sancto. Singulariter, inquam, quantum ad reliquas in divinitate personas, primordialiter etiam quantum ad creaturas. Nam quod in 993Ccreaturis connexio solet inveniri est de imitatione, vel similitudine Spiritus sancti. Ne mireris quod haec quae supradicta sunt per remotionem posuimus, ut ea quae sentienda sunt planius et plenius intelligamus. Primordialiter itaque unitas pertinet ad ingenitum et idcirco in Trinitate omnia unum propter ipsum. Aequalitas primordialiter pertinet ad unigenitum, et idcirco in Trinitate omnia aequalia propter ipsum. Connexio singulariter pertinet ad Spiritum sanctum, et ideo in Trinitate omnia connexa propter ipsum.
Cur attribuatur potentia Patri, sapientia Filio, bonitas Spiritui sancto.
Addis adhuc ut quaeras quid mihi causae videtur 993Dcur potentia Patri in Scripturis sanctis specialius attribuitur, sapientia Filio, charitas vel bonitas Spiritui sancto. Si non dixero nisi quod in codicibus vestris invenitur, forte superfluum judicabitur; si quid aliud forte exsufflabitur, irridebitur. Merito ejusmodi timere debuissem si nescirem apud quem in aure loquens sermonem seu sensum meum effunderem. Tibi utique; tibi, inquam, libenter dico quod sentio. Quid sit potentia, quid sit sapientia, quid charitas vel bonitas omnes in commune novimus, et quotidiano experimento probamus. In his itaque quae manifesta et nobis nota sunt erudimur, ni fallor, ad eorum notionem quae humanae capacitatis modum excedunt. In his enim tribus forma quaedam et imago summae Trinitatis exprimitur, 994Aet quoddam nobis velut speculum proponitur, ut invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciantur. Quae igitur sunt in Trinitate ista, respondent his quae sunt in Trinitate illa, tria tribus, similia similibus, propria propriis, singula singulis. Videmus quia potest esse multiplex potentia etiam ubi nulla est vel esse potest sapientia. Taceo de elementis, vel quibuslibet rebus insensatis. In rebus autem animatis et brutis est potentia audiendi, videndi, potentia ambulandi, comedendi et bibendi, etc. hujusmodi, in his vero nulla sapientia est, nulla naturaliter inesse potest. Constat ergo, quod superius jam dictum est, quia potest esse multiplex potentia ubi nulla potest esse sapientia. Econtra autem ubi nulla potentia est, nulla sapientia 994Binesse potest. Nam posse sapere absque dubio est aliquid posse. Dat itaque esse posse non sapientia potentiae, sed potentia sapientiae. Item, constat quod Lucifer ille, qui mane oriebatur, multam habet potentiam, multam sapientiam, sed nullam omnino voluntatem bonam. Bonitatis est autem bene velle. Quid est enim bonitas nisi bona voluntas? Testis itaque est Lucifer ille obduratus in sua perversitate quod possit esse multiplex potentia simul et multiformis sapientia, ubi nulla manent bonitatis vestigia. Econtra autem nulla bonitas inesse poterit ubi sapientia vel potentia omnino defuerit. Nam posse bene velle est aliquid posse. Sapientiae vero est discernere inter bonum et malum, et sine hujusmodi 994Cdiscretione nescit voluntas quid sit eligendum. Ut possis ergo bonitatem habere, oportet ut scias et valeas bonum eligere. Potentia dat posse, sapientia dat nosse, sine quibus bonitas non prodest ad esse. Contrahit itaque suum esse bonitas non tam a sapientia quam potentia. In hac itaque rerum Trinitate sola potentia non est de reliquarum aliqua, sapientia autem est de potentia sola, bonitas vero de potentia simul et sapientia. Vides certe quomodo in hac rerum Trinitate expressae sunt proprietates Trinitatis illius summae et aeternae. Ibi est persona ingeniti quae non est ab alio aliquo; ibi est persona geniti, quae est ab ingenito solo; ibi est persona Spiritus sancti, quae est tam a genito quam ab ingenito. Quoniam ergo in potentia exprimitur proprietas 994Dingeniti, speciali quodam considerationis modo merito ascribitur illi. Sed quoniam in sapientia exprimitur proprietas geniti, merito et illa juxta eumdem modum ascribitur ipsi. Item, quia in bonitate proprietas Spiritus sancti invenitur, merito et ei bonitas specialius assignatur. Ecce quomodo ex hac rerum Trinitate surgit consideratio ex qua per exemplum ostenditur qualiter quod de divinis proprietatibus legitur intelligi valet. Sed ex eadem rerum speculatione consideratio oritur longe ista sublimior, ex qua ratiocinando colligitur quod idem ipsum omnino fateri oportet. Sed in his metam figimus quoniam quaestioni vestrae nos satisfecisse jam credimus.
On the Three Things Appropriated to the Persons in the Trinity
991BYou ask of me, my Bernard, what I think of that saying of Augustine's, in which unity is attributed to the Father, equality to the Son, and to the Holy Spirit the concord of both. Gladly do I open to another self what I feel, wishing to share it if I understand anything rightly, or in however small a part, and at the same time seeking to be corrected if I feel otherwise about anything. Let us, if you please, consider the properties of each, and perhaps what we seek will shine forth. 991CThe subsistence of the Unbegotten, which is not from any other, introduces no plurality and implies no plurality in that by which it is substantially or personally what it is; for in that which it begets it confers nothing upon itself, but upon the Son alone, that he may be. But the subsistence of the Begotten, which has received from another what it has, just as it is not able to be through itself, so neither is it able to be understood through itself. If, then, the subsistence of the Son introduces plurality, how much more the subsistence of the Holy Spirit, which is from two? Rightly, therefore, is unity attributed to the Father, in the consideration of whose subsistence no plurality appears to concur. Let us add this too: that whatever can be said substantially is truly one. But you say that this too is common to him with 991Dthe others; yet without doubt the Father alone has this by way, so to speak, of primacy, whereas the others have it by way of reception, and according to the likeness of another. Hence, then, it is gathered why unity is attributed to him, according to this consideration, as it were specially. See how unity is in the Father; let us seek how equality is in the Son. Certainly, where there is no plurality, equality can neither rightly be said nor understood. For just as nothing is rightly called like to itself, so neither equal. And so, where plurality first occurs, there also must equality first be sought. Now it is established that the Son is the image of his Father, but not the Father the image of the Son. Hence that saying of Augustine's: The Father and the Son are not together both an image, but the Son alone is the image of the Father. Hear also this of the same: An image, 992Bif it perfectly fulfills that of which it is the image, is itself made equal to it, and not it to its image. But it is certain that the Son grasps and expresses the fullness of him whose image he is. And so, according to Augustine's opinion, the Son is made equal to the Father, not the Father to his image. Rightly, therefore, is equality attributed not to the Father, but to the Son. But why, you say, not also to the Holy Spirit? Yet if you can say why the Son alone in the Trinity 992Cis called the image of another, you will consequently understand why equality is attributed to the Son alone, and not at the same time also to the Holy Spirit. But in those things which are said according to substance, equality is attributed not only to the Son but also to the Holy Spirit; yet according to primacy the Son alone has this, and not the Holy Spirit. Nevertheless, if propriety of speech were preserved in a matter of this kind, it would rather be called identity than equality. See, now you have why unity is attributed to the Father and why equality to the Son; it remains to ask why the concord of both is attributed to the Holy Spirit. As there is no quality without a plurality of things subsisting, so too the concord of two, which is set down as a third something, is not without a trinity of things subsisting. In the Father is the origin of unity, in the Son the beginning of plurality, in the Holy Spirit the completion of the Trinity. 992DHence it ought to shine clear to you how deservedly he who is the third person in the Trinity is called the concord of the others. Let us now consider the properties of each, and we shall see that the relation of the Father to the Son is one thing, and to the Holy Spirit another. No less does the Son stand in one way toward the same Spirit, and in another toward his Father. But both the Father and the Son stand uniformly toward the Spirit of both, and conversely the same Spirit stands uniformly toward both the Father and the Son. Rightly, then, is he called the concord of the others, in whom the uniformity of relation is found in every form. Let us add this too: that the same willing and the same not-willing makes the fullness of concord; and so he is rightly called the concord of the two, who is 993Athe love of both. But why he is called love rather than the wisdom of both seems another question. Now, however, let us see how we are to understand what Augustine adds to the things set down and expounded above, when he says: And these three are all one on account of the Father, all equal on account of the Son, all connected on account of the Holy Spirit. If there had been the person of the Unbegotten alone, there would nonetheless be unity in the divinity. And so primordially, so to speak, unity is in the Unbegotten alone, but according to his likeness or emanation it is also both in the Only-begotten and in the Holy Spirit. Likewise, if there were the person of the Unbegotten alone, there would have been no equality in the divinity; and if the person of the Holy Spirit alone were lacking, there would nonetheless have been equality in the divinity. Hence one must weigh 993Bthat equality is primordially in the Only-begotten alone, yet according to his likeness it is also in the Holy Spirit. Take away the Holy Spirit, and there will be in the divinity no one who is the connection of the several. But perhaps you still press for why, the Trinity existing, the connection of all is attributed to the Holy Spirit alone. But we know that the remaining two stand differently toward the Only-begotten, whereas the Holy Spirit alone stands indifferently toward both the Unbegotten and the Begotten, and both of them stand uniformly toward the Holy Spirit. And so singularly is the connection of all attributed to the Holy Spirit. Singularly, I say, as regards the other persons in the divinity, and primordially also as regards creatures. For the fact that connection is wont to be found in 993Ccreatures is from the imitation or likeness of the Holy Spirit. Do not wonder that we have set down the things said above by way of removal, so that we may understand more plainly and more fully the things that are to be perceived. And so primordially unity pertains to the Unbegotten, and therefore in the Trinity all things are one on account of him. Equality primordially pertains to the Only-begotten, and therefore in the Trinity all things are equal on account of him. Connection singularly pertains to the Holy Spirit, and therefore in the Trinity all things are connected on account of him.
Why power is attributed to the Father, wisdom to the Son, goodness to the Holy Spirit.
You add further that you may ask what reason appears to me 993Dwhy power is more specially attributed to the Father in the Holy Scriptures, wisdom to the Son, love or goodness to the Holy Spirit. If I say nothing but what is found in your books, it will perhaps be judged superfluous; if I say anything else, perhaps it will be blown away and derided. Deservedly should I have feared such a thing, did I not know into whose ear I pour out my speech or my thought as I speak. To you assuredly; to you, I say, I gladly tell what I feel. What power is, what wisdom is, what love or goodness is, we all know in common, and prove by daily experience. And so by these things which are manifest and known to us we are instructed, unless I am mistaken, toward the knowledge of those things which exceed the measure of human capacity. For in these three a certain form and image of the highest Trinity is expressed, 994Aand something like a mirror is set before us, so that the invisible things of God may be beheld, understood through the things that are made. The things, therefore, that are in this trinity answer to those that are in that Trinity — three to three, like to like, properties to properties, each to each. We see that there can be manifold power even where there is no wisdom, nor can be any. I say nothing of the elements, or of any insensible things whatever. But in animate and brute things there is the power of hearing, of seeing, the power of walking, of eating and drinking, and the like; yet in these there is no wisdom, nor can any be present by nature. It is established, then, as has already been said above, that there can be manifold power where there can be no wisdom. But conversely, where there is no power, no wisdom 994Bcan be present. For to be able to be wise is without doubt to be able to do something. And so it is not wisdom that gives being-able to power, but power that gives it to wisdom. Likewise, it is established that that Lucifer, who used to rise in the morning, has much power and much wisdom, but no good will at all. But it belongs to goodness to will well. For what is goodness but a good will? And so that Lucifer, hardened in his perversity, is witness that there can be manifold power and at the same time manifold wisdom, where no traces of goodness remain. But conversely no goodness can be present where wisdom or power is wholly lacking. For to be able to will well is to be able to do something. But it belongs to wisdom to discern between good and evil, and without such 994Cdiscernment the will does not know what is to be chosen. Therefore, that you may be able to have goodness, you must both know and be able to choose the good. Power gives the being-able, wisdom gives the knowing, without which goodness avails nothing toward being. And so goodness draws its being not so much from wisdom as from power. And so in this trinity of things, power alone is from none of the rest, but wisdom is from power alone, and goodness from power and wisdom together. You see clearly how in this trinity of things the properties of that highest and eternal Trinity are expressed. There is the person of the Unbegotten, which is not from any other; there is the person of the Begotten, which is from the Unbegotten alone; there is the person of the Holy Spirit, which is both from the Begotten and from the Unbegotten. Since, therefore, in power the property of the 994DUnbegotten is expressed, it is deservedly ascribed to him by a certain special mode of consideration. But since in wisdom the property of the Begotten is expressed, it too is deservedly ascribed to him according to the same mode. Likewise, because in goodness the property of the Holy Spirit is found, goodness too is more specially assigned to him. See how from this trinity of things there arises a consideration by which it is shown, through an example, how what is read concerning the divine properties can be understood. But from the same contemplation of things there arises a consideration far more sublime than this, from which, by reasoning, it is gathered that one must confess altogether the very same thing. But here we fix our goal, since we now believe that we have satisfied your question.